Lehman Brothers was established in 1850 when
Henry Lehman and his brothers started up a shop which sold to local farmers
(Harvard, 2012) and from these humble beginnings Lehman rose to become
America’s 4th largest investment bank. Lehman’s rise in the 21st
century originated from a change in strategy. This was driven by the Federal
Reserve slashing interest rates to 1% (Displacement: stage one of financial
crisis). Following this Lehman moved through stage two (credit expansion) and
stage three (bubble/mania) of financial crisis.
Lehman Brothers logo (Google Images, 2013)
Traditionally
Lehman had pursued a low risk strategy which involved originating and purchasing
assets to sell them on while not investing their own capital or holding assets
on their balance sheet. In the early
2000s the bank decided to change to an aggressive, higher risk strategy which
involved using their own capital to buy assets and then storing these assets. Management
at Lehman believed they were missing out on the advantages of the bullish
market that many of their competitors were exploiting (Valukas, 2010). Although
this high risk strategy was not uncommon among investment banks, it proved
especially risky for Lehman as they had a small equity base and high leverage
(Valukas, 2010).
As
the boom (stage two of crisis) progressed Lehman invested heavily in property,
leveraged loans and the mortgage market including the sub-prime market. The aim
of this strategy was high revenue growth which was achieved by an increase in
the bank’s balance sheet and risk.
When
the sub-prime crisis set in, Lehman believed that by pursuing a
counter-cyclical strategy they could increase their advantage over competitors.
At this time the economy had moved to stage four of the crisis: distress, but behaviour
at Lehman still displayed signs of a stage three crisis for example mania and irrational
exuberance*. Lehman had pursued this counter-cyclical strategy before during
the downturn of 2001-2002 and it had proved successful, leading to an increased
market share, so they continued their aggressive capital destructive strategy
when many other banks were raising and hoarding capital (Cohan, 2012). This
pursuit of market domination was what ultimately led to the downfall of Lehman.
Graphs illustrating the aggressive growth
strategy at Lehman: First graph showing the increase in asset base and the
second showing increasing net revenue
(Both
graphs composed using data cited in Valukas, 2010)
Irrational
Exuberance: “Unsustainable investor enthusiasm that drives asset prices up to
levels that aren’t supported by fundamentals” (Investopedia, 2013)
Bibliography
1. Bebchuk et al . (2009). The wages of failure:
executive compensation at Bear Sterns and Lehman 2000-2008. Harvard Law School : Discussion
Paper. 657 (1), 1-28. (Available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Bebchuk_657.pdf)
2.
Cohan,
W. (2012) Lehman E-mails Show Wall Street Arrogance Led to the Fall. Available:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-06/lehman-e-mails-show-wall-street-arrogance-led-to-the-fall.html.
Last accessed 3rd Feb 2013
3. Craig, S. et al (2008) AIG, Lehman Shock Hits
World Markets. The Wall Street Journal, 16 Sept. Available
at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122152314746339697.html
4. Harvard Business School. (2012) History of Lehman Brothers. .Available:
http://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/lehman/history.html. Last accessed 3rd Feb 2013.
5. Investopedia. (2012). Irrational Exuberance Available:
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/irrationalexuberance.asp#axzz2K9e2BRip.
Last accessed 6th Feb 2013.
6. Valukas, A. ( 2010) Lehman Brothers Holding
Inc. Chapter 11 Proceedings Examiner Report. Jenner & Block, Volumes: 1-9
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